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Several of the States have followed the decisions of the
English and United States courts which we have already dis-
cussed. Louisiana, 58 in 1858, adopted the doctrine that the
master of a vessel could not bind the owners by signing a bill of
lading for goods not actually delivered on board. In Fellows v.
steamer Powell 59 (186i) Judge Laud held that the master, in
signing bills of lading for goods not received, acted outside of
his authority and failed to bind the owner. In 1877 the case of
Hunt v. Miss. Cent. R. R.60 was decided. Judge Marr gave the
decision of the court in a very strong opinion. He said that the
consignee ordinarily could not verify the signature of the agent
or determine the genuineness of the bill of lading, hence that he
must and does rely almost entirely on the honesty of his cor-
respondent-the shipper-who has perfect information concern-
ing the genuineness of the bill of lading. If this is misplaced
confidence the railroad is not liable. He held that the station
agent had no authority to issue false bills of lading and that the
statute which made them negotiable in that State applied only
to genuine bills. The Legislature has no more power to bind a
carrier on a false bill of lading or one signed by a person not
authorized, than it has to make a person liable on a promissory
note or bill of exchange signed in his name by one not author-
ized to bind him. The agent would be liable but not the
carrier. Judge Egan and DeBlanc dissented from this opinion
of Judge Marr on the following grounds: (i) That as the law is
unsettled in this country it should be made to conform to the
custom of trade ; (2) that the spirit of the statute was such as
would hold the carrier liable ; and (3) that the agent was act-
ing in the usual course of his employment and should therefore
bind the carrier. Massachusetts has the earliest case on this sub-
58 Fearn v. Richardson, 12 La. Ann.
59 I6 La. Ann. 316.
80 29 La. Ann. 446.
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ject-Walter v. Brewer 61 (1814). In this case it was held that
the owners of a vessel might contradict a false bill of lading
issued by the master, although it was in the hands of an inno-
cent purchaser, because the master in signing the bill had acted
beyond his authority. In i86i Judge Hoar, in deciding the
great case of Seats v. Wingate,62 said, "When the master is act-
ing within the limits of his authority, the owners are estopped in
like manner with him; but it is not within the general scope of his
authoriO
, 
to sign bills of lading for any goods not actually on board."
Ohio has followed this rule. Dean v. King
3 (1871), was a suit
by the consignee of a bill of lading against the owner of the
vessel whose master had issued it. It was held competent to
show by parol that the goods in controversy had not been re-
ceived by the master: (i) Because the bill of lading was a
receipt; and (2) because the master had no authority to issue it
until the goods were on board. Missouri, in La. Nat. Bk. v.
LavielleG4 (1873) held that a bank which had paid a bill of
exchange on faith of the attached bill of lading, could not
recover from the owners of a vessel for non-delivery of the
goods mentioned in the bill of lading, when said goods had
never been received by the master who signed the bill of lading.
Maryland, in B. and 0. R. R. v. Wilkens 6 5 (1875) held that a
bona fide holder for value of a false bill of lading could not
recover against the railroad whose agent had signed the bill.
But in 1876 the Legislature passed a very broad statute on this
subject which will probably change the course of decisions in that
State.66 North Carolina, in Williams v. W. R. R.
6 7 (1885) has fol-
lowed the doctrine of the United States courts and has decided
that the agent of a railroad has no authority to sign a bill of
lading for more goods than are shipped. Indiana, in Louisville,
etc., R. R. zi. Wilson66 (1889), adopted the same view and
allowed a bill of lading to be contradicted so far as it was a
receipt. 69 Minnesota is in the same line. McC6rd v. W. U. Tel.
Co.,10 applied the estop.pel doctrine, but was overruled by Nat.
61 11 Mass. oo.
62 3 Allen 103.
63 2Z 0. St. II8.
64 52 MO. 380.
65 44 Md. xi.
66 See Tiedeman v. Knox, 53 Md. 612.
67 93 N. C. 42.
68 119 Ind. 350.
6P See also Union R. R. and Trans. Co. v. Yeager, 34 Ind. i.
70 39 Minn. 181.
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Bank v. C. B. and W. R. R.71 (1890) which adopted the United
States rule. Judge Mitchell regarded the arguments for
estoppel as very strong, but thought the question settled and
that the States should follow the United States rule for the sake
of uniformity. He also held that the statute,72 making bills of
lading negotiable did not affect the question.
(3) Let us now examine the cases which hold that carriers,
as against bona fide holders for value, are estopped to deny the
truth of the statements made by their agents in the ordinary bill
6f lading.
While the English authorities already discussed settle the law
in that country, yet there has been some conflict even there. In
Howard v. Tucker3 (1831) it was held that the owners of a vessel
were estopped by a bill of lading which stated that freight had been
paid, from asking freight of an assignee of the bill, although the
freight had never been paid. Berkley v. Watling 74 (1837) seems
to favor'the bona fide holder. Judge Patterson said, "This
decision will not affect any question which may arise hereafter
as to the conclusiveness of a bill of lading between the ship-
owner and an indorsee for value. I should be sorry to destroy
the negotiability of the instrument." Chief-Justice Holt was of
the opinion,7 5 "That the merchant was answerable for the deceit
of his factor; for seeing somebody must be a loser by the
deceit, it is more reasonable that he that employs and puts trust and
confidence in the deceiver should be a loser, than that a stranger should be."
As late as 1883, we have a strong English case which holds that
the doctrine of estoppel is applicable to a very similar instru-
ment-C. S. & Co. v. Gr. E. R. R. 76 In this case the agent of
the railroad issued two original "delivery orders" for the same
consignment of goods. C. S. & Co. made advances on both.
orders in good faith. It was held that the railroad was liable on
both. The court said, "The documents have a certain mercan.
tile meaning attached to them and therefore the defendants
owed a duty to the merchants and persons likely to deal with
these documents." It does not seem possible to reconcile this
case with Grant v. Norway and Hubbersty v. Ward. However,
this is not sufficient to throw the English doctrine into doubt,
and Grant v. Norway must still be considered authority.
7144 Minn. 224.
72 (1878) Ch. 124 § 17.
73 1 Bar. & Ad. 712.
74 7 Ad. & El. 29.
75 In I Salk. 289.
76 L. R. II Q. B. D. 776.
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Several of our State courts have adopted the estoppel theory
and hold that the carrier is liable to a bona fide holder for value
on a false bill of lading issued by its agent. They, like the
other courts rest their decisions chiefly on the doctrine of agency,
and hold that the agent whose duty it is to issue bills of lading
acts within the apparent scope of his employment even when he
issues a bill of lading for goods not in fact shipped, and hence
that the carrier is bound. New York has taken the lead in hold-
ing this view. In x85 i-the very year of Grant v. Norway, alid
four years earlier than schooner Freeman v. Buckingham-Judge
Edmonds, in Dickerson v. Seelye,77 said, "As between the
owner of the vessel and an assignee for a valuable consideration
paid on the strength of the bill of lading, it may not be ex-
plained.7 8 In such case the superior equity is with the bona fide
assignee who has parted with his money on the strength of the
bill of lading." Armour v. Mich. Cent. R. R.79 (x875) was a case
where the agent was induced by forged warehouse receipts to
issue bills of lading. The agent was told that they were to be
used to secure advances. They came into the hands of a bona
fide holder for value. Chancellor Gray said, "The well recog-
nized principle that a party who, by his admissions has induced
a third party to act in a particular manner, is not permitted to
deny the truth of his admissions, if the consequences would be to
work injury to such third party, applies to and governs this
case." Chancellor Dwight, in the same case, said that Grant v.
Norway had been severely criticised and that New York had
decided against it. He held that the railroad had put confidence
in the agent and had clothed him with the apparent authority to
issue these false bills. He said, "The bills of lading were issued
with the expectation that they would be acted upon by bankers
and other capitalists; the defendants cannot complain if they
have accomplished the purpose for which they were designed.
The representations in the bills were made to any one who may
think fit to make advances on the faith of them. There is
present every element necessary to constitute a case of estoppel
inpais-a representation made with knowledge that it might be
acted upon and subsequent action on faith of it to sAch an ex-
tent that it would injure the plaintiff if the representations were
not true." The same doctrine was applied, in Griswold v.
77 12 Barb. 99.
78 See, also, Portland Bk. v. Stubbe, 6 Mass. 422; Abbott on Ship, 323-4;
and Bradstreet 'v. Lees, M. S. U. S. Dist. Court.
79 65 N. Y. iii.
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Haven,80 to a receipt. In Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v.
Brie R. R.81 (1878) the bank had a lien on some wheat owned by
W. W. agreed to sell the wheat to N. and gave him an order on
the warehouse to deliver it to the railroad subject to his (W.'s)
orders. The railroad agent gave N. a bill of lading without
any evidence of N.'s right to the property. The bank made
advances on this bill. It was held that the bank could recover
from the railroad for the wrongful and negligent act of its
agent. The Bank of Batavia v. N. Y., L. E. and W. R. R. 82
(1887) has settled the law in New York. This was a case where
the alleged consignor and the agent of the railroad entered into
a conspiracy to defraud any one who might rely on their false
bills of lading. The bank was defrauded and sued the railroad.
The court said, "It is a settled doctrine of the law of agency in
this State, that where the principal has clothed the agent with power
to do an act upon the existence of some extrinsic facts necessarily andpeculiarly
within the knowledge of the agent, and of the existence of which the act
of executing the power is of itself a representation, a third person deal-
ing with such agent in entire good faith, pursuant to the apparent
power, may rely upon the representation, and the principal is
estopped from denying its truth to his prejudice." It was
further said that the railroad knew the character and uses of
their bills of lading and expected the banks to rely upon them.
The bank knew nothing of the agent's lack of authority to issue
these particular bills and had no way to find out except from the
agent himself, and he had already indicated his authority by his
signature. The bank was compelled to rely upon the agent and
the railroad must be estopped from denying the bills of lading.
Connecticut seems to have adopted this view. The leading case in
this State on the power of agents to bind their principals, is
Bridgeport Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R.83 (i861). In this case
the transfer agent of the railroad issued fraudulent certificates of
stocks far in excess of the capital stock. He and his partner,
owned one hundred and sixty genuine shares. They deposited
certificates for ninety shares with the bank as collateral. They
afterwards transferred their genuine shares to other parties.
Held that the ninety shares are presumed to be a part of the one
hundred and. sixty genuine shares. The fact that the genuine
shares had been transferred, made no difference. This was a
80 25 N. Y. 595.
81 72 N. Y. 88.
82 io6 N. Y. 195.
83 30 Conn. 231.
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fraud on the bank and the railroad con) pany was held liable for the
agent's act. Certificates of stock signed in blank have a kind of
negotiability and are similar to bills of lading. In Relyea v.
New Haven R. M. Co. 84 (1875), Judge Shipman held that the
consignee who had paid for the full amount of goods mentioned
in the bill of lading could recoup in an action for freight to the
value of the goods not delivered. In this case the captain of the
vessel had signed the bill of lading for six tons of iron more
than were shipped. It was thought that, as the instrument was
quasi negotiable, the master (who was also the owner) owed a
duty to innocent purchasers and if they were deceived by his
agent, a legal liability was imposed. Kansas has already adopted
the estoppel theory. In Wichita Savings Bank v. A. T. and St.
Fe R. R.85 (z878), the agent of the railroad issued two bills of
lading for the same consignment of wheat, and the bank made
advances on one of them. The shipper having become insol-
vent, the bank sued the railroad. Chief-Justice Horton, in a
very elaborate opinion, showed that the bulk of trade in grain
and produce was done by bills of lading. Dealers were accus-
tomed to buy grain, have it delivered, secure bills of lading,
attach drafts, secure advances, and, in this way, carry on an ex-
tensive cash business with but a small capital. This is not only
an advantage to the dealer, but it also gives the producers a
better market, enables the banks to get fair interest on the
security of the bills of lading, and furnishes additional business
for the railroad by facilitating and increasing shipment. A
mode of business so beneficial to so many classes ought to re-
ceive the favoring recognition of the law. "In accordance with
well-settled rules the plaintiff, * * * having made advances
on the faith of the bills of lading, issued by the agent of the
company within the a~parent scope of his authority, was entitled to
recover of such defendant all damages resulting to him from the
issuance of two original bills of lading, * _X * and the
defendant was bound by the act of its agent, and therefore estopped
from denying that it had the grain mentioned in the bill of
lading sued on. When the defendant knew to what uses bills of
lading could be and usually were employed, it was guilty of neg-
ligence in issuing two original bills for the same wheat." The
bank was not guilty of negligence and, hence, had the superior
equity on the doctrine that "whenever one of two innocent
parties must suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled
64 42 Conn. 579.
85 20 Kan. 59.
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such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it." The
decision was not dependent upon the negotiability of the instru-
ment. Bills of lading were not considered fully negotiable
independent of statute, "but in the absence of legislation the
defendant ought not to have authority to issue bills of lading
for grain, and thus put it;into the power of the holder thereof to
trade with the public on the representations made in them, and
then * * * contradict the representations of the paper and
thereby injure the persons who have been misled. The princi-
ple of estoppel does and ought in such cases to apply." Nebraska
has adopted the same view. In Sioux City, etc., R. R. v. First
Nat. Bk.8 (188o), the agent of the railroad had issued bills of
lading for five cars of wheat when only about one-half of a car
had been shipped. The bank discounted a draft on faith of the
bills, and finding that the consignor had absconded, sued the
railroad. After a review of the authorities the court held that
all the elements of estoppel were present and that the railroad
was liable. It was said that the principle of estoppel had been
entirely overlooked in Grant v. Norway and the cases following
it. Pennsylvania, in Brooke v. N. Y., L. E. and W. R. R.r-
(1885), has followed the New York rule. Brooke was consignee
of grain and had advanced on bills of lading which- called for
more than was shipped. The contract was made in New York
and the law of that State would govern, but the Pennsylvania
court agreed with the New York decisions. Judge Sterrett held
that Brooke's claim was both reasonable and just. He quoted
C. S. & Co. v. Gr. E. R. R.88 (already discussed) with approval
and said that the true limit of an agent's authority as between
the principal and third parties is the apparent aztthoriy with which
he is invested, but as between the principal and the agent it is the
express authority.8 9 Hence the principal is bound by the acts of
his agent which are within the scope of the authority which he
is held out to the world to possess, notwithstanding the agent
acted contrary to instructions. 90 The authority of the agent is
implied from the performance of similar acts with the consent of
the priucipal.91 When one of two innocent parties must suffer
from the acts of an agent, the one who has held out the agent as
86 io Neb. 556.
87 io8 Pa. St. 529.
88 L. R. ir Q. B. D. 776.
89 Evan's Agency 594, 6o6.
90 Whart. Cont, ,q 96, 130, 269.
91 Evan's Agency 193, note.
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worthy of trust should suffer.92 It was held that public policy
and the good of the corporations themselves demanded the
-application of these rules. "Under the circumstances the de-
fendant is estopped from denying what its accredited shipping
agent asserted in the bills of lading, by which the plaintiffs with-
out any fault on their part were misled to their injury. It is
contended that inasmuch as no authority, real or apparent, to.
issue bills of lading without receiving the goods, had been given
by the railroad to Wiess (the agent), it was not responsible for
his unauthorized acts, even to innocent third parties who were
misled and injured thereby. We cannot assent to this proposi-
tion: It is conceded that the company did not authorize the
issuance of bills of lading without receipt of the goods, but itput
Wiess in its place to do that class of acts, and it should be responsible
for the manner in which he conducts himself within the range
of his agency." Illinois also holds this doctrine. In St. L. and
I. M. R. R. v. Larned 93 (1882) the agent of the railroad by mis-
take sent goods to the wrong place. On learning of his mistake
he issued a bill of lading in which he agreed to re-ship the goods
to their proper destination. The goods had already been
delivered at the other place to another party. Lamed, who was
consignee of the goods, and who had made advances on the last
bill of lading, was allowed to recover from the railroad. The
court held that it would be fraud to permit the railroad to
escape liability by showing that the statements in the bill of
lading were not true. It was held to be, in the fullest sense, an
estoppel on the railroad. In the case of Tibbits v. R. I. and P.
R. R 94 (1893) the consignee of wheat who had paid for the full
amount mentioned in the bill of lading was allowed to recover
from the railroad for a failure to deliver that amount, although
it was shown that the railroad had delivered all it received.
Judge Cartwright held that bills of lading were of material aid
to traffic and business and were constantly used in securing
advances. That th6 railroad was bound to know this and was
liable to one who had in good faith made such advances. Ala-
bama, under the statute of 188i, has adopted this doctrine. In
Jasper Trust Co. v. K. C. M. and B. R. R. 95 (1892) the agent of
the railroad not only issued false bills of lading but also issued
them to a fictitious firm. They came into the hands of the trust
92 Evan's Agency 591.
93 103 Ill. 293.
94 49 Ill. Ap. 567.
95 99 Ala 416.
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company, for value. Chief-Justice Stone held that before the
passage of the statute in 188x, the trust company would have had
no remedy against the railroad. The statute as incorporated in
the code of 1886 (sec. 1179) is as follows: "If any common
carrier, not having received things or property for carriage,
shall give or issue a bill of lading, or receipt, as if such things
or property had been received, * * * such carrier "- * *
is liable to any person injured thereby for all damages, imme-
diate or conse.quential therefrom resulting." Under this statute
the railroad was estopped as against the trust company.
From the cases discussed above it is evident that there is a
plain conflict of authority in this country. The arguments have
been given so fully in connection with the cases that it is not
necessary to re-state them here. However, it seems that the
question on which the courts are divided is the question of
agency. We believe all the courts agree that so long as the
agent is acting within the scope of his authority the principal is
bound. Even in the case of Pollard v. Vinton 96 it is said, "A
corporation cannot be charged with any intelligent action, or
with entertaining any purpose, or committing any fraud, except
as this intelligence, this purpose, this fraud is evidenced by the
actions of its officers. And while it may be conceded that for
many purposes they are agents and are to be treated as agents of
the corporation, or corporators, it is also true that for some pur-
poses they are the corporation, and their acts as such officers are its
acts." There is no question but that if the agent had authority
from the corporation to issue a false bill of lading, the represen-
tations contained in it would be binding on the corporation and
it would be estopped to deny them as against innocent pur-
chasers. The question is, does the agent of a common carrier,
when he signs a bill of lading for goods not in fact shipped, act
within the scope of his authority? If he does, the act is the act
of the carrier, and the carrier will be liable for the reasonable
consequences of that act. If he does not, the carrier is not lia-
ble. One class of decisions holds that he does not act within the
scope of his authority, while the other holds that he does. The
first class arrives at the conclusion that so far as the carrier is
concerned the false bills of lading are absolutely void, while the
second class concludes that they are the representations of the
carrier which estop it from denying them to the injury of those
who have in good faith relied upon them.
96 105 U. S. 7.
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We are forced to admit that the great weight of authority is
against considering the acts of the agent, in issuing a false bill of
lading, as within the scope of his authority, so as to work an estoppel
against the carrier; but we are of the opinion that, when we
consider the legal character- of the instrument itself, its uses and
importance in commercial transactions, the demands of modern
business methods, and the usual principles of the law of agency,
the arguments of those who favor the doctrine of estoppel are
more nearly in accord with custom, reason and justice, than are
the arguments of those who oppose it.
It is not contended that the carrier gives the agent authority
to issue bills of lading for goods not in fact shipped. But it
must be acknowledged that the carrier does give him authority to
sign bills of lading under certain circumstances which are
peculiarly within the agent's knowledge and about which the
public knows and can know nothing. The very issuance of the
bill in due form is an assertion by the agent that he is acting
within his authority and that the proper circumstances do exist.
If the carrier holds out its agent as worthy of confidence, gives
him the power to make out a prima fade case, puts him into a
position to make representations in the name of the carrier upon
which a purchaser has a right to rely and does rely, the carrier
and not the innocent purchaser ought to suffer.
Modern business methods and the character and uses of the
instrument demand this view. In McNeil v. Hill 97 (1865) where
a false warehouse receipt came into the hands of an innocent
purchaser, Mr. Justice Miller said, "As civilization has advanced
and commerce extended, new and artificial modes of doinig busi-
ness have superseded the exchanges by barter, and otherwise,
which prevailed while society was in its earlier and simpler
stages. The invention of the bill of exchange is a familiar illus-
tration of this fact. A more modern, but still not recent inven-
tion, of a like character, for the transfer withotit the somewhat
cumbersome and often impossible operation of actual delivery of
the articles of personal property, is the indorsement and assign-
ment of bills of lading and warehouse receipts. Instruments of
this kind are suigeneris. From long usage in trade they have
come to have among commercial men a well-understood mean-
ing and the indorsement or assignment of them as absolutely
transfers the general property of the goods and chattels therein
named, as would a bill of sale. * * * If the warehouseman
gives to a party who holds such a receipt a false credit, he will,
97 Woolworth's R. 96.
BILLS OF LADING.
not be suffered to contradict his statements which he has made
in the receipt so as to injure a party who has been misled by it.
That is within the most exact definition of estoppel." It seems
to us that present developments and circumstances demand that
this principle be carried one step further and applied to the car-
rier whose agent has issued a false receipt. Such a step would
give the fullest confidence to this class of securities which is so
important. It would make carriers responsible for the honesty
of their agents and would not require of the merchants and
banks, who deal with these instruments, the often impossible
and always difficult task of ascertaining whether the goods have
actually been shipped.
This view finds a strong support in the rule which holds a
bank bound by the act of its proper officer in certifying a check,
although the bank has no funds with which to pay it. Certifying
a check when there are no funds in the bank with which.to pay
it seems quite as much beyond the authority of the cashier or
teller as issuing a false bill of lading is beyond the authority
of the freight agent. Yet no court has decided that a check so
certified is not binding upon the bank, where third parties have
acquired interests in ignorance of the true facts. The question
of negotiability does not enter into the case. It is purely a
question of agency and estoppel. 98 On this question the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the ricent case of Hill v. Nat.
Trust Co. s9 has said, "If his (the cashier's) authority as between
himself and his principal was in fact restricted to cases in which
the drawer had sufficient funds, and he either intentionally or
by mistake, transcended the authority by making the check good
when the drawer thereof had no funds, the consequences of his
blunder should be visited, not upon the innocent holder of the check,
but upon the agent's employers who put it in his power to commit the
wrong." It seems to us that this same doctrine should be applied
to carriers whose agents have issued bills of lading for goods
not in fact shipped.
This view finds support also in the rule applied to the issu-
ance of certificates of stock in a corporation which are said to be
paid up when in fact they are not paid up. Mr. Morawetz 100
says, "It is well settled, if certificates for paid-up shares, issued
by the regular agents of the company in the ordinary form, have
been transferred to an innocdnt purchaser, the company will be
98 Biglow on Estoppel, 4th ed., 516.
99 io8 Pa. St. i.
100 Mor. on Corporations, § 836.
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bound by he statement in the certificates, that the shares were fully paid
z p. Under these circumstances, the conmpany will be estoped from
denying that the representations of its agents were true."
Another indication that this rule is demanded is to be found
in the fact that many of the States are passing statutes on this
subject and some of them expressly hold the carrier liable.
At present, however, the conflict of authority is irreconcila-
ble and the rule of law to be applied to any particular case must
be determined from the jurisdiction whose laws govern that case.
2. H. Cobbs.
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